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CRIMINAL APPEALS IN CANADA
RICHARD FUNSTON*
The governmental system of Canada, like that of the United
States, is federal in nature. But the two systems are hardly mirror
images. From an examination of the problems of judicial or-
ganization, the criminal law, and appellate review in the Canadian
system, the student of American law may gain insights useful to
the understanding of his own.
Unlike our federal government, the Canadian Dominion
Government is limited not by defining its functions but by estab-
lishing an area of jurisdiction upon which it must not encroach.
In contrast with the Tenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, the British North America Act delimits the powers of
the subordinate governmental agencies, i.e., the provinces, and
leaves the residue of power to the central government.' Among
those powers exclusively vested in the Dominion Parliament is the
authority over criminal legislation.2 The provincial legislatures,
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Diego State College, Ph.D.
University of California, Los Angeles, 1970.
1. 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (1867) [hereinafter cited as B.N.A. Act]. See also
H. SMITH, FEDERALISM IN NORTH AMERICA (1923); W. KENNEDY, THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF CANADA (1938); R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (1963);
B. LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, TExT & NOTES ON DisTRiu-
BUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 1 passim (1960).
2. B.N.A. Act § 91(27). See also LASKIN, supra note 1, at 823ff.
There is a provincial power to impose fine and imprisonment. Such law is
commonly called "quasi-criminal," but, except for the need to preserve the con-
stitutional division, it is indistinguishable from Dominion criminal law. Most
provinces, for example, make it an offense to drive an automobile imprudently.
Mere imprudence differs from recklessness in the theory of criminal responsi-
bility, and so these provincial acts do not clash with the Criminal Code provi-
sions banning reckless driving. O'Grady v. Sparling, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145 (1960).
The provincial law must be based upon some class of subjects within the
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however, are expressly empowered to legislate with respect to the
administration of justice, including the maintenance and organiza-
tion of the courts.3  The chief responsibility, thus, for the en-
forcement of the criminal law rests with the Attorney-General of
each province, although the law itself is embodied in a Dominion
code.4
This code is administered in a consolidated, unilinear court
system which avoids the parallel federal and state jurisdictions
provincial field of jurisdiction and the power itself is not an independent source
of legislation. If there is a clash, federal law prevails. But occasionally the
idea of exclusive powers works out so that a provincial penal enactment will be
held ultra vires, although it does not clash with a federal statute. V. MAcDoN-
ALD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VALIDITY OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION 3 (1951);
LASKIN, supra note 1, at 71.
The Dominion, on the other hand, cannot by purporting to enact a criminal
law under its admitted powers "appropriate to itself exclusively a field of juris-
diction in which, apart from such a procedure, it could exert no legal authority,"
and the courts have nullified such attempts. Atty.-Gen. Ontario v. Reciprocal
Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328.
3. B.N.A. Act § 92(14).
Section 101 of the B.N.A. Act, which directs the Parliament of Canada to
establish a general court of appeal, also enables it to provide for "the Estab-
lishment of additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Can-
ada." It is debatable whether the Parliament could establish courts for the ordi-
nary administration of the criminal law in the provinces. See Atty.-Gen. On-
tario v. Atty.-Gen. Canada and Atty.-Gen. Quebec, [1947] A.C. 127; LASKIN,
supra note 1, at 803ff.
4. 1953-54 (Can.), c. 51.
Canadian courts like those of the U.S. are the appointed guardians of the
Constitution, but the B.N.A. Act offers a much more limited scope for judicial
interpretation than does the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Haines, Judicial Review
o1 Legislation in Canada, 28 HAv. L. REv. 565 (1915); Grant, Judicial Review
in Canada: Procedural Aspects, 42 CAN. B. REV. 195 (1964). In practice, only
one constitutional question ever comes before the Canadian courts, i.e., the ques-
tion of the distribution of legislative power between the Provinces and the
Dominion. Thus, the "Dominion's Criminal Law power looms as an effective
constitutional restraint on provincial laws that aim at circumscribing political and
religious liberties." Russell, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion Since 1949, in POLITICS: CANADA 76 (P. Fox ed. 1962). See, e.g., Saumur
v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 4 D.L.R. 681; Birks and Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v.
Montreal, [19551 S.C.R. 799; Switzman v. Elbling and Atty.-Gen. Quebec, [1957]
S.C.R. 285, 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337. But no Canadian statute, whether Dominion or
provincial, can ever be declared invalid on the ground that it violates some
principle which the Constitution has protected from all legislative interference.
In 1960, a Dominion Bill of Rights was provided for by statute. 8-9 Eliz.
2, c. 44. But see R. v. Gonzales (1961) 35 C.R. 155; R. v. Steeves (1964)
1 C.C.C. 266, 42 D.L.R. (2d) 335; Re Williams v. Williams (1961) 29 D.L.R.
(2d) 107; Wolfe v. Robinson (1961) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 233 (1962) O.R. 132.
See also SCOTr, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM (1959);
SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA (1964); LASKIN, supra note 1, at 938ff.
Vol. 2
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characteristic of American judicature.5 The superior court of rec-
ord in each province is part of a unitary structure leading directly
to the Supreme Court of Canada." There is no court of crimi-
nal appeal similar to that in England, but questions of law aris-
ing in a criminal trial may be reserved and brought before the
provincial court of appeal, and if that court is not unanimous,
appeal may be had to the Supreme Court.7
I. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
The right to such an appeal, however, is regarded by Cana-
5. One of the principle advantages of this single system of judicial ad-
ministration is greater legal uniformity than is common in the U.S. Inasmuch
as the criminal law is under the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament, it is uni-
form throughout the Dominion. There is, however, a so-called "provincial crim-
inal law" consisting of offenses created by the Provinces for the enforcement of
provincial legislation. B.N.A. Act § 92(15). See generally Grant, The
Search for Uniformity of Law, 32 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1082 (1938); Willis,
Securing Uniformity of Law in a Federal System-Canada, 5 U. TORONTO L.J.
352 (1944). But see note 11 infra.
6. Concerning the legal definition of "court of appeal" and the jurisdic-
tions thereof, see CAN. CluM. CODE § 2(9).
Since 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada has been the final Court of
appeal for the Dominion. 1949 (Can.), 13 Geo. 6, c. 37; R.S.C. 1952, c. 259,
§ 54. Prior to that date, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sitting
in London, was the final appellate court in most Canadian cases. See R. v.
Bertrand (1867) L.R. 1 P.C. 520, 530; R. v. Coote (1873) L.R. 4 P.C. 599.
In 1888, a section of the Canadian Criminal Code prohibited criminal appeals
to the Judicial Committee. But this section was declared ultra vires in 1926 on
the grounds that its effective worth depended upon extraterritorial powers which
a dominion statute could not have and because it was repulsive to the Privy
Council Acts, applying to Canada and which Canada could not alter or repeal.
Nadan v. R. [1926] A.C. 482. Cf. 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 53, § 17; British Coal
Corp. v. R., (1935) 51 T.L.R. 508. See LASKIN, supra note 1, at 821ff.
Regarding contemporary Canadian sentiment concerning appeals to the
Privy Council, see Raney, Nations Within the Empire, CANADIAN MAGAZINE,
February, 1921, at 291; Tupper, The Position of the Privy Council, J. CMP.
LEaISLATION (3d), v. iii, pt. iv; W.P.M. Kennedy in 13 CAN. B. REv. 621
(1935); and especially F.R. Scott in 15 CAN. B. REV. 485 (1937).
In addition to the Supreme Court of Canada, there is but one other federal
court in the Canadian judicial system, the Court of Exchequer and Admiralty.
See DAWSON, supra note 1, at 424-25.
7. The appellate provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code are contained
in H9 581-601, which are largely derived from § 1012-1022 of the former Code
enacted in 1923. 1923 (Can.), c. 41. These sections were themselves generally
dependent upon the British Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, Imp., c. 23. Although
there are important differences between the Canadian Code and the Criminal
Appeal Act, the two are so closely related that the decisions of the English
Court of Criminal Appeal have very persuasive authority in Canada. See, e.g.,
R. v. Lauzon, 74 C.C.C. 37, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 606 (Que. C.A.), applying Trimble
v. Hill (1880) 5 App. Cas. 342, 49 L.J.P.C. 49.
3
Funston: Criminal Appeals in Canada
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1971
CALIFoRNIA WESTERN ITERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
dian jurisprudence as "exceptional." Thus, no statute conferring
or enlarging upon a right of appeal has ever been applied retroac-
tively to permit an appeal from a decision rendered prior to the
passage of the Act.9
A. Right of Appeal of Person Convicted
The present statutes allow a person convicted by a trial court
to appeal to a court of appeal either against his conviction or
against his sentence.' 0 An appeal against conviction may be had
by the accused on any of the following grounds:
(1) on a question of law alone;
(2) on a question of mixed law and fact;
(3) upon the certificate of the trial court that the
case is a fit one for appeal; or,
(4) upon any other ground which appears to the
court of appeal to be a sufficient ground for appeal.
An appeal against sentence, however, can be had only in those
cases where the sentence is not one fixed by law.II
B. Right of Appeal of Attorney-General
That feature of Canadian criminal appeals which is most
strikingly different from the criminal procedure common in the
United States is the provision for appeals by the Attorney-General
8. Welch v. R. [1950] S.C.R. 412, 3 D.L.R. 641.
9. R. v. St. Onge, (1923) 26 Que. P.R. 4 (C.A.).
10. CAN. CRIM. CODE § 583.
11. As noted supra note 5, the Canadian system of judicial organization
results in a high degree of uniformity of law. See also R. v. Lee Kim
[1930] 2 W.W.R. 441, 42 B.C.R. 360. But with the great variety in circum-
stances and with the extensive discretion left in most cases as to punishment, it
is practically impossible to achieve any uniformity as to sentences. R. v.
Gordon (1924) 25 O.W.N. 572 (C.A.); R. v. Young [1933] O.W.N. 777
(C.A.); R. v. Zizu Natanson [1927] 2 W.W.R. 154, 49 C.C.C. 89 (Sask. C.A.).
As O'Halloran, J.A., pointed out in R. v. Switlishoff [1950] 1 W.W.R. 913,
9 C.R. 428 (B.C. C.A.): "There is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a
particular crime. No doubt in somewhat similar circumstances it is desirable to
avoid marked disparity in sentences. But the individual himself and his sur-
rounding conditions cannot be ignored." See also R. v. Simpson (1956) 114
C.C.C. 152 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lemire and Gosselin (1948) 5 C.R. 181, 92
C.C.C. 201 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carriere (1952) 14 C.R. 391 (Que. C.A.).
"There is also the question to what area should the attempt at uniformity ex-
tend? Winnipeg, Manitoba, or Canada?" R. v. Jourdain and Kudyba (1958)
28 C.R. 125, 25 W.W.R. 160, (Man. C.A.) (Coyne, J.A.). See also opinion of
Stuart, J.A., in R. v. Adams [1921] 3 W.W.R. 854, 65 D.L.R. 211 (C.A.).
Vol. 2
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against a judgment of acquittal by a trial court, on any ground
that involves a question of law alone, or against a sentence passed
by a trial court, unless that sentence is one fixed by law.' 2 This
is not to say that the Crown, even though it may unearth new and
crucial evidence, may institute new proceedings against a person
who has been previously acquitted or convicted of the offense. 13
Indeed, the initiation of a second jeopardy for the same offense
is proscribed by sections 516-519 of the Criminal Code, dealing
with the special pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.'4
According to Haultin, C.J.S., writing in R. v. Bayn, the maxims
set forth in sections 516-519, "state a fundamental rule of our
criminal law, which does not permit a person to be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense."' 5
Problems, however, have arisen in Canadian jurisprudence
in connection with attempts to set forth standards by which the
identity of offenses may be tested. One test which has been sug-
gested is whether the facts out of which the two prosecutions
arose are the same.'" But this test was severely criticized by
Lord Reading, C.J., in R. v. Barron. 7  According to Lord Read-
ing, the true test is the "substantial identity" of the offense with
12. Though former section 1013(4) conferred the right of appeal solely
upon the Attorney-General of a Province, section 601 of the revised Code now
confers an equal right of appeal upon the Attorney-General of Canada. R. v.
Gallant (Harry and Frank) (No. 2) 83 C.C.C. 55, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 471 (P.E.I.
C.A.); R. v. Perry, 18 M.P.R. 144, 84 C.C.C. 323, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 762 (P.E.I.
C.A.); R. v. Hodgson (1927) 59 N.S.R. 202, 47 C.C.C. 171 (C.A.). Concerning
who is an "Attorney General," see R. v. Brewerton [1936] 3 W.W.R. 433, 4
D.L.R. 703 (Alta. C.A.).
The contrary American rule is stated in Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100
(1904) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection prevents appeal by Gov-
ernment after verdict of acquittal). See also Forman v. U.S., 361 U.S. 416
(1960); U.S. v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957); Sapir v. U.S., 348
U.S. 373 (1955); U.S. v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909); U.S. v. Sanges, 144
U.S. 310 (1892).
13. R. v. Sheen (1827) 2 Car. & P. 634, 172 Eng. Rep. 287.
14. Canadian law correspondingly proscribes a second conviction for a re-
lated offense if both charges arise out of the same series of events or if the
evidence necessary to sustain both charges is identical. R. v. Georgieff and
Dickemous, [1955] Ont. W.N. 148, 20 C.R. 142 (C.A.); R. v. Nugent, [1955]
Ont. W.N. 291, 20 C.R. 360 (C.A.); R. v. Harper, [1950] Ont. W.N. 791, 11
C.R. 31 (C.A.). The initial conviction constitutes a bar to prosecution for the
related offense. R. v. Harper, [1950] Ont. W.N. 791, 11 C.R. 31 (C.A.).
15. [1932] 2 W.W.R. 113, 59 C.C.C. 89 (C.A.).
16. R. v. King [1897] 1 Q.B. 214, 18 Cox C.C. 447 (C.A.).
17. [1914] 2 K.B. 570, 10 Cr. App. R. 81. See also R. v. Kendrick and
Smith (1931) 23 Cr. App. R. 1, 29 Cox C.C. 285 (C.A.); and R, v, Blanchet
(1919) 30 Que. Q.B. 66, 61 D.L.R. 286 (C.A.).
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which the accused is charged with that for which he was formerly
acquitted or convicted, or of which he might have been convicted
upon the former indictment.
Lord Reading's formulation, i.e., the test is the similarity of
offenses and not the similarity of the facts that support the charges,
is the rule currently followed in Canada. i s As a result, an acquit-
tal is considered as an acquittal not only of the offense actually
charged, but also of all other offenses of which the accused might
have been found guilty under the former indictment. For exam-
ple, since a jury may always on an indictment for murder, convict
for manslaughter, an acquittal on a charge of murder will support
a plea of autrelois acquit if the accused is later indicted for man-
slaughter with respect to the same homicide.19 On the other
hand, if the offense charged in a subsequent prosecution is not
one for which the accused could have been convicted under the
former indictment, the plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict
is inapplicable.2 0  The basis of the special pleas is that the ac-
cused may not be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense,
and it must follow that if, in the first prosecution, he was not ac-
tually in jeopardy the special pleas are irrelevant.21
Thus, Canadian law prohibits the Crown from placing a
criminal suspect in jeopardy with respect to the same offense more
18. R. v. Beechin (1958) 119 C.C.C. 182 (N.B. C.A.); R. v. Lamontagne
[1945] O.R. 606, 4 D.L.R. 161 (C.A.); R. v. Brown [1945] O.R. 869, [1946]
1 D.L.R. 741 (C.A.). See also R. v. Logan (No. 1) [1944] 1 W.W.R. 101
(Alta. C.A.); R. v. Badiuk, [1930] 1 W.W.R. 210, 2 D.L.R. 318 (C.A.).
The American rule on successive prosecutions for similar offenses is dis-
cussed in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). See also Gore v. U.S., 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356
U.S. 571 (1958); Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1931).
19. R. v. Ferguson [1945] 2 W.W.R. 230, 3 D.L.R. 535 (Sask. C.A.). See
also R. v. Weiss and Williams (No. 1) (1913) 4 W.W.R. 1358, 13 D.L.R. 166;
(No. 2) 5 W.W.R. 18, 13 D.L.R. 632; R. v. Cameron (1901) 4 C.C.C. 385
(Ont.).
The rule is the same in the U.S., Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Price
v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). But cf. Stroud v. U.S., 251 U.S. 15 (1919);
Trono v. U.S., 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
20. R. v. Barron, [1914] 2 K.B. 570, 10 Cr. App. R. 82; R. v. Quinn (1905)
11 Ont. L.R. 242, 10 C.C.C. 412 (C.A.). The circumstances, however, may be
such as to give rise to the doctrine of res judicata.
21. R. v. Schwartz, 15 M.P.R. 575, [1941] 2 D.L.R. 332 (N.S. C.A.) (Hall,
J.); Vaux's Case (1591) 4 Co. Rep. 44, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (C.A.).
See R. v. Dunn [1945] 2 W.W.R. 495, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 297 (C.A.) (the
quashing of an indictment does not permit a plea of autrefois acquit); R. v.
Considine (1885) 8 L.N. 307 (Que.) (the discharge of a jury without giving a
Vol. 2
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than once. But appeal by the prosecution upon a legal question
from the trial of the first instance is considered to be a continua-
tion of the original jeopardy not an initiation of a second jeopardy.
II. THREE PROBLEMS
Obviously the allowance for appeal by the prosecution from
a decision dismissing a criminal charge is a deviation from the
common law norm. As might be anticipated, Canada has ex-
perienced certain technical problems with the scheme. Two of
the most critical difficulties have been definitional in nature, while
a third involves the rules of evidence.
A. Law or Fact?
Apart from the appeal specially provided in capital cases,22
it is only on questions of law that there is any right of appeal with-
out leave of the court of appeal.23 An accused may appeal,
with leave, either on any ground involving a question of mixed
law and fact or on any other ground which appears sufficient to
the court. But the Crown is not entitled to appeal against an
acquittal in any case except on questions of law. 24  Attorneys-
General, however, have at times succeeded in bringing appeals
upon grounds which would seem at first glance to be questions of
fact. For example, although a jury's finding of fact is not a
question of law and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Attor-
ney-General, a conclusion of mixed law and fact, such as the guilt
or innocence of the accused, may depend upon the legal effect of
certain findings made by the judge or jury and as such has been
held to be a question of law. 25  Thus, the question whether the
verdict is not equivalent to an acquittal); R. v. Somers [1929] 2 W.W.R. 366,
3 D.L.R. 772 (C.A.) (the withdrawal of an information before an accused is
called upon to plead will not constitute an acquittal).
See also Re R. v. Eicker; Re R. v. Fry, 64 O.L.R. 1 [1929] 3 D.L.R. 760
(C.A.) (Riddell, J.A.); R. v. Crystal Dairy Ltd. [1938] 3 W.W.R. 470, 4 D.L.R.
427 (C.A.); R. v. Rowat [1928] 2 W.W.R. 633 (Sask.); Blanchard v. Jenkins
(1930) 55 C.C.C. 77 (Man.).
22. CAN. CRIM. CODE § 597A grants an extraordinary right of appeal to
the Supreme Court to a person convicted of a capital offense. He may appeal,
without leave of the Court, either on law or on fact. See, e.g., Lucas v. R.
(1963) 39 C.R. 101, appeal dismissed.
23. This is given to convicted persons by section 583(a)(i) and to the
Attorneys-General by section 584(1) (a) of the CAN. CluM. CODE.
24. Appeals against sentence, by either the accused or the Crown, require
the leave of the Court of Appeal.
25. Belyea v. R.; Weintraub v. R. [1932] S.C.R. 279, 2 D.L.R. 88. But cf.
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ground of appeal is a question of law or one of fact is of critical
importance.2"
B. What is an Acquittal?
The legal definition of "acquittal" constitutes a second major
problem in connection with appeals by the Crown. Being an
exception to the common law rule, the right of appeal by the
prosecution can be established only by very clear statutory lan-
guage.17  Under the present Criminal Code, Canadian Attorneys-
General can appeal only in cases of acquittals, and Canadian
courts have strictly confined this right of appeal to the language
of the enactment creating it, refusing to allow the Crown to appeal
from an order quashing an indictment.2 s But, where a magistrate
did not dispose of the charge to which the accused had pleaded
R. v. Grotsky [1935] 3 W.W.R. 257, [1936] 1 D.L.R. 128 (Sask. C.A.); R. v.
Ransley [1942] 1 W.W.R. 783, 2 D.L.R. 520 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Bower [1941]
O.R. 51, 2 D.L.R. 269 (C.A.).
26. For a particularly thorough discussion of the problem, see R. v. Ash-
croft [1942] 3 WW.R. 455, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 146 (B.C. C.A.).
It has been held that questions of admissibility of evidence are questions of
law. R. v. Rasmussen, 9 M.P.R. 41, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 97 (N.B. C.A.). See
infra concerning improper rulings on evidence as grounds for appeal.
On the other hand, if a trial judge rejects evidence of a confession, not on
the ground that it has been illegally obtained, but merely because he is not
satisfied that it was freely and voluntarily made, there is no question of law
involved, and the Crown cannot appeal from a subsequent acquittal. R. v. Bois-
joly (1955), 22 C.R. 19 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Marakami (1951), 1 W.W.R. (N.S.)
742, 12 C.R. 12, aff'd on other grounds [1951] S.C.R. 801, 4 D.L.R. 370; R. v.
Dreher (1952), 5 W.W.R. 377, 14 C.R. 399 (Alta. C.A.).
But an appeal may be brought where a trial judge rejects a confession on a
wrong principle of law. Dupuis v. R., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 516, 15 C.R. 309; R. v.
Theriault (1953), 17 C.R. 1 (Que. C.A.).
See also R. v. Ferland (1968) 41 C.R. 1 (Que. C.A.). But cf. Rose v. R.,
[1959] S.C.R. 441, 31 C.R. 27; R. v. J., (1957) 21 W.W.R. 248, 26 C.R. 57
(Alta. C.A.); R. v. Davis and Toubret (1952), 29 M.P.R. 260, 14 C.R. 54
(N.S. C.A.); R. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., [1949] 1 W.W.R. 175 (B.C. C.A.).
27. Benson v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Bd. [1942] A.C. 520.
28. R. v. Gamble (1847) 16 M. & W. 384, 153 E.R. 1237 (C.A.); R. v.
London, J.J. [1945] K.B. 528, 2 All E.R. 298 (C.A.); R. v. Hansher [1940] O.R.
247.
But cf. Lattoni and Corbo v. R., [1958] S.C.R. 603, 121 C.C.C. 317; R. v.
Hayward (1957), 118 C.C.C. 365 (N.B. C.A.); R. v. Mattioli; R. v. Nadeau
(1953), 17 C.R. 138 (Que. C.A.).
See also R. v. Harder [1947] 1 W.W.R. 461, 2 D.L.R. 593 (C.A.); R. v.
Tremblay (1949), 8 C.R. 323, 95 C.C.C. 385 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Leveille
(1959), 32 C.R. 98 (Que.); R. v. Orlin, [1945] R. L. 374 (Que. C.A.); R. v.
Ballard, 5 M.P.R. 136, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 461 (N.S. C.A.); R. v. Hutchinson [1939]
1 W.W.R. 545, 71 C.C.C. 199.
Vol. 2
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guilty and convicted them instead of an offense with which they
had not been charged, the court of appeal held that this result
should be taken as equivalent to an acquittal on the original
charge so as to enable the Attorney-General to appeal.29
C. Introduction of New Evidence on Appeal
A third problem arises in Canadian criminal appeals with
respect to the introduction of new evidence on appeal. Canadian
courts of appeal are empowered to hear the evidence of further
witnesses, but there are apparently no express provisions for re-
ceiving further evidence by affidavit or for the examination of
witnesses abroad." ° The Court of Criminal Appeal in England
enjoys a similar power, which it exercises with extreme caution.
Very exceptional circumstances must be shown before the court
will reconsider a verdict in the light of new evidence not adduced
at trial,3 ' and it is only upon the rarest possible instance that the
court will act on evidence presented on appeal which could have
been introduced at the trial. As Lord Alverstone, C.J., said in
R. v. Dutt, "It would be impossible to conduct the business of
this court if defendants set up one defence at the trial and an-
other on appeal."32
The principle upon which Canadian appellate courts will
receive new evidence is similar to those upon which a new trial
will be granted in a civil action because of the discovery of fresh
evidence. A somewhat wider discretionary scope, however, is
29. R. v. Blahut and Hannick, [1954] Ont. W.N. 618, 19 C.R. 104 (C.A.).
Cf. U.S. v. Jorn, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 547 (1971).
The question of appeal after a plea of guilty is an interesting, if peripheral,
issue. It has been held that, where an accused pleads guilty, judgment of guilt
is pronounced not by a judge or jury but by the accused himself; therefore, the
only appeal that will be permitted in such a case will be an appeal from sen-
tence. Boushard v. R.; Demers v. R. (1930) 49 Que. K.B. 221 (C.A.). On the
other hand, where affidavits disclose that a plea of guilty was entered by the
accused under a misunderstanding and that he may have a good defense, leave
should be granted to appeal from the conviction. R. v. Hand, [1946] 1 W.W.R.
421, [1946] 1 D.L.R. 128 (C.A.). But this ground will not be available if the
accused pleaded guilty on the advice of experienced counsel. R. v. Forde [1923]
2 K.B. 400, 17 Cr. App. R. 99; R. v. Dawson (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 111. See
also R. v. Deacon, [1947] 1 W.W.R. 545, 3 C.R. 129; R. v. German, [1947] O.R.
385, 4 D.L.R. 68.
30. CAN. CRIM. CODE § 589(1)(b). See, e.g., R. v. Sloane, 1 M.P.R. 546,
[1930] 4 D.L.R. 129 (N.S. C.A.).
31. R. v. Mason (1923) 17 Cr. App. R. 160.
32. (1912) 8 Cr. App. R. 51.
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applied in criminal than in civil appeals, since the Crown is not
in the position of a successful litigant with a vested interest in con-
viction."3 Nonetheless, the court must be satisfied that the evi-
dence could not by due diligence have been adduced at trial and
also that, if admitted, the new evidence will apparently be de-
terminative. 34  An application for leave to present new evidence,
therefore, must be supported by an affidavit which: (a) indicates
the evidence to be introduced; (b) sets forth the time and man-
ner in which the accused was made aware of the existence of the
evidence; (c) shows what efforts, if any, he made to introduce the
evidence at trial; and (d) states that the accused is advised and
believes that if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it
might reasonably have resulted in a different verdict. 1
III. GROUNDS FOR ALLOWING APPEALS
There are four possible grounds on which the court of ap-
peal may allow an appeal:
(1) an unreasonable or unsupported verdict;
(2) misdirection;
(3) improper rulings as to evidence; or,
(4) any other grounds involving a miscarriage of justice. "
With respect to the first of these, the court, in granting an appeal
must be satisfied that no reasonable man, given the evidence ad-
duced at trial, could have arrived at the verdict given3 7 or that
33. R. v. Buckle, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 833, 3 D.L.R. 418 (B.C. C.A.).
34. R. v. Cumyow, [1926] 1 D.L.R. 623 (C.A.); R. v. Boss (1921) 16 Cr.
App. R. 71; R. v. Schwanbeck; R. v. De la Gorgendierre [1931] 3 W.W.R. 59,
3 D.L.R. 745 (Sask.).
In a like manner, where the new evidence could not have come to the
knowledge of the accused until after the trial, e.g., an unauthorized communica-
tion with the jury, it will be received on appeal. Nogaret v. R. (1931) 51 Que.
K.B. 1888 (C.A.).
35. R. v. Milligan (1954) 35 M.P.R. 372, 21 C.R. 16 (N.B. C.A.); R. v.
Deacon (No. 2), [1947] 1 W.W.R. 834, 3 C.R. 397 (C.A.); Beaulieu v. R. (1949),
8 C.R. 345 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Popovich, [1946] O.W.N. 929 (C.A.); R. v.
Grigoshenko and Stupka, [1945] 3 W.W.R. 734, 85 C.C.C. 129 (Sask. C.A.);
R. v. Martin, [1945] 1 W.W.R. 1, 1 D.L.R. 128 (C.A.); R. v. Johnson and
Creanza, [1945] 3 W.W.R. 201, 4 D.L.R. 75 (C.A.); R. v. Weisz (1920),
15 Cr. App. R. 85; R. v. Rowland, [1947] K.B. 460, 32 Cr. App. R. 29.
36. CAN. CRIM. CODE § 592(1)(a).
37. Taggart v. R., 38 M.P.R. 100, 23 C.R. 372 (N.S. C.A.); Lefrancois
v. R., 26 C.R. 370 (Que. C.A.); Vaillancourt v. R. (1954), 17 C.R. 422 (Que.
C.A.); R. v. Kohut and Bird (1955), 111 C.C.C. 149 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. Clancy,
38 M.P.R. 89 (N.B. C.A.); R. v. Malanik (No. 2) 3 W.W.R. (N.S.) 577, 13
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the evidence adduced at trial, though tending to support the ver-
dict given, is insufficient to support the charge with requisite cer-
tainty. 8 This ground for appeal would seem unavailable to the
Crown, since in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence it is unneces-
sary to produce evidence to justify an acquittal.39 Thus, it has
been held that, if there be no misdirection, a verdict of acquittal
rendered by a properly instructed jury involves only a question of
fact, which the Crown may not appeal.40 Misdirection, however,
may be either to law or to fact, and misdirection as to law gives
the Crown, as well as the accused, a ground for appeal.4 '
Appeals may also be granted on the ground of improper
rulings on evidence, and the Crown is as entitled to appeal against
the improper rejection of evidence as the accused is to appeal
against its improper admission.42 The mere fact that evidence
has been improperly admitted, however, is not determinative. It
must be shown that some substantial injustice was occasioned
thereby.4  Thus, there have been cases in which the other evi-
dence, apart from that improperly admitted, was conclusive,
and it was held that there had been no miscarriage of justice. 44
C.R. 160 (Man. C.A.); Holmes v. R. (1950), 10 C.R. 231, 98 C.C.C. 224
(Que. C.A.); R. v. Dobchuck, [1944] 2 W.W.R. 319 (Man. C.A.); R. v. West-
gate, [1944] 2 W.W.R. 353, 52 Man. R. 161 (C.A.); R. v. Bercovitch and Som-
berg (1946), 1 C.R. 200 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Deacon (No. 3), [1948] 1 W.W.R.
705, 3 D. L.R. 93 (C.A.).
38. R. v. Brown (1954), 36 M.P.R. 161, 21 C.R. 247 (sub nom. Brown
v. R.) (N.B. C.A.); R. v. Cannon and Egley (1955), 111 C.C.C. 153 (B.C.
C.A.); Forget v. R. (1954), 18 C.R. 233 (Que. C.A.); R. v. McDonald
(1951), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 14, 101 C.C.C. 78 (B.C. C.A). Cf. R. v. Harrison
(No. 3) 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 318, 12 C.R. 314 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. Boyd,
[1953] O.R. 215, 16 C.R. 412 (C.A.); R. v. Groulx and Nevers, [1953] O.R. 337,
16 C.R. 145 (C.A.).
39. With respect to the grounds for allowance or dismissal of appeals, the
general rule is that there is no distinction between the Crown's position and that
of accused. Cullen v. R. [1949] S.C.R. 658, 3 D.L.R. 241; R. v. George [1960]
S.C.R. 871.
40. R. v. Gailant (Harry and Frank) (No. 2) 83 C.C.C. 55, [1945] 1 D.L.R.
471 (P.E.I. C.A.).
41. R. v. Cohen and Bateman (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 196. See also R. v.
Kervin (1931) 5 M.P.R. 35, 57 C.C.C. 240 (N.S. C.A.). As for self-misdirec-
tion by the trial judge, see Telmosse v. R., 83 C.C.C. 133, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 779
(S.C.C.); R. v. Ellergodt [1963] 2 C.C.C. 129 (B.C. C.A.).
42. R. v. Rasmussen, 9 M.P.R. 41, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 97 (N.B. C.A.).
43. R. v. Woods (1897) 5 B.C.R. 583, 2 C.C.C. 159 (C.A.); R. v. Drum-
mond (1905) 10 Ont. L.R. 546, 10 C.C.C. 340 (C.A.).
The American "harmless error" rule is stated in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
44. R. v. Spain [1917] 2 W.W.R. 465, 36 D.L.R. 522 (C.A.); R. v. Barclay,
1971
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But where inadmissible evidence has been admitted and that evi-
dence may (not must) have influenced the jury in arriving at
their verdict, that verdict must be quashed.45
Furthermore, the administration of Canadian criminal law
must not only be, "but appear to be in accordance with. . . basic
concepts of justice. ' 46  Even the appearance of injustice at the
trial is sufficient to set aside a verdict.47 Among these so-called
"other grounds" on which an appeal may be allowed are irregu-
larities at trial,48 incomplete defense, e.g., denial of full-opportun-
ity for cross-examination, 49 and prejudicial newspaper reports be-
fore the trial."
For an appeal to be granted on any of these grounds, how-
ever, it must be clear that a "substantial wrong or miscarriage of
justice" has occurred.5 Obviously the appellate provisions of the
Canadian Criminal Code are not based upon the principle that
criminals must go free because of some trivial error of no material
consequence. 2  But once an error of consequence has been dem-
36 Ont. W.N. 351, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 489 (C.A.); R. v. Pavalini [1942] 1 W.W.R.
74, [1941] 4 D.L.R. 183 (C.A.).
Cf. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
45. R. v. Frechette (1920) 46 Ont. L.R. 610, 51 D.L.R. 246 (C.A.);
White v. R. (1924) 38 Que. K.B. 195 (C.A.); R. v. Ortinsky [1927] 1 W.W.R.
957, 2 D.L.R. 973 (C.A.); R. v. Pepper [1937] 1 W.W.R. 62, 1 D.L.R.
517 (C.A.); R. v. Buck [1940] O.R. 444, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 302 (C.A.). See also
Allen v. R. (1911) 44 S.C.R. 331, 18 C.C.C. 1, disapproving in part R. v. Woods
(1897) 5 B.C.R. 583, 2 C.C.C. 159 (C.A.); Cassidy v. R., 50 Que K.B. 388,
[1931] 4 D.L.R. 192 (C.A.).
46. Vescio v. R., [1949] S.C.R. 139, 149 (Rand, J.).
47. R. v. Darlyn [1947] 1 W.W.R. 449, 3 D.LR. 480 (C.A.).
48. R. v. Petrie (1890) 20 O.R. 317 (C.A.); R. v. Wong Yip Lan and Lee
Lung [1936] 1 W.W.R. 478, 2 D.L.R. 403 (C.A.).
49. R. v. Swinamer (1951) 26 M.P.R. 197, 12 C.R. 211 (N.S. C.A.)
Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
50. R. v. Bannister, 10 M.P.R. 391, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 795 (N.B. C.A.); R.
v. Koufis, 15 M.P.R. 459, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 609 (N.S. C.A.); cf. R. v. McDonald
[1940] O.R. 7, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 377 (C.A.).
With respect to American practice in this matter, see Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
51. CAN. ]RIM. CODE § 592(1)(b)(iii). Concerning the meaning of the
phrase, see opinion of Stuart, J.A., in R. v. Picariello and Lassandro [1923] 1
W.W.R. 644, 1 D.L.R. 979.
Cf. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (untainted evidence
against petitioner was "overwhelming"), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967) (before error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare
its belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
52. Chibok v. R., 24 C.R. 354, 116 C.C.C. 241. See also Lawries v. Muir
[Scot. 1950] Just. Cas. 19; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
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onstrated, the burden is on the Crown to satisfy the court of ap-
peal that this has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice.53 Thus,
for example, if the court cannot say that no substantial wrong or
injustice has resulted from the improper admission of evidence, it
is not enough for the Crown to show that without the inadmissi-
ble evidence the verdict would probably have gone the same
way. 54
IV. APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeal's disposition of a case is usually final,
for, although an appeal may in some instances be taken to the
Supreme Court of Canada, that court's authority in criminal mat-
ters is limited. Either an accused whose conviction has been af-
firmed by the court of appeal or an Attorney-General may ap-
peal to the Dominion Supreme Court on any question of law on
which an appellate judge dissents or, if leave to appeal is granted
by the Supreme Court, on any other question of law.55 In other
words, except for the extraordinary appeals in capital cases, the
Supreme Court's criminal appellate jurisdiction is limited to ques-
tions of law alone.58 No appeal from sentence, therefore, lies to
the Supreme Court, even though the court of appeal may have,
on appeal of the Crown, increased the sentence imposed at the
53. Brooks v. R., [1927] S.C.R. 633, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 268; Schmidt v. R.,
[1945] S.C.R. 438, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 598; Thomas v. R., [1952] 2 S.C.R. 344,
15 C.R. 1.
54. R. v. Berry, [1957] O.R. 249, 26 C.R. 218 (C.A.); Parent v. R. (1947)
4 C.R. 127 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Barris, [1946] 1 W.W.R. 328, 2 D.L.R. 655 (Alta.
C.A.); R. v. Parker, (1960) 45 Cr. App. R. 1.
Regarding the effect of comment on the failure to testify, cf. R. v. Darlyn
(No. 2), [1947] 2 W.W.R. 872 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. McNulty and Court-
ney, [1948] Ont. W.N. 827 (C.A.); with R. v. Steinberg, [1931] O.R. 222 (C.A.);
R. v. Schwartzenhauer, [1935] 2 W.W.R. 146, 2 D.L.R. 739.
The "harmless error" standard in the United States is stated in Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967). Concerning the American law on prosecutorial comment, see Griffin
v. California, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
Cf. CAN. Evm. AcT, R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, § 5, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. CAN. CRIM. CODE §§ 597-598.
In the case of an appeal by the accused from the affirmance of a convic-
tion by the Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General is entitled to file a cross-
appeal. Howard Smith Paper Mills Ltd. v. R., [1957] S.C.R. 403, 8 D.L.R. (2d)
449.
56. R. v. McEwan and Lee, [1932] 3 W.W.R. 564, 59 C.C.C. 75 (Alta.
C.A.). See also Canada International Paper Co. v. Cour de Magistrat, [1938]
S.C.R. 22, 1 D.L.R. 194.
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trial.57 Nor may new evidence be introduced upon appeal to the
Supreme Court.58
V. CONCLUSION
From this brief survey of the Canadian law of criminal ap-
peals it should at least be evident that, procedurally and substan-
tively, Canadian practice is both unique and complex. Nonethe-
less, Canadians are proud of their system, and their satisfaction
is not unfounded. The existing division of jurisdiction over the
criminal law, whereby Parliament creates it and the provinces
enforce it, has worked quite well. It does away, for example, with
all those questions of extradition that can arise between states in
the U.S.59 It guarantees local control of the police, which is a
well-approved British device to forestall a nation-wide tryanny,
and at the same time it hampers the excesses of legislation to which
parochial lawmakers are too often prone.60 As for the wisdom
and effect of the allowance for appeals by the Crown, it is per-
haps best to rely on the testimony of Peter J.T. O'Hearn, Q.C., an
eminent Canadian constitutional lawyer and political philosopher:
In the United States . . . protection against double jeop-
ardy is provided in federal cases by the Fifth Amendment.
The wording is construed to prevent appeals by the prosecu-
57. Goldhar v. R., [1960] S.C.R. 60, 31 C.R. 374; Goldhammer v. R.,
[1924] S.C.R. 290, 3 D.L.R. 1009. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact, see R. v. Fitton,
[1956] S.C.R. 958, 6 D.L.R. (2d) 529.
58. Liscombe v. R. (1962) 36 W.W.R. 665, 37 C.R. 7 (Alta. C.A.).
59. P. O'HFARN, PEACE, ORDER AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 162 (1964).
It also eliminates the so-called "two sovereignty" problem which the United
States Supreme Court has encountered in interpreting the application of the
double jeopardy protection in a federal system. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959); Abbate v. U.S., 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
60. But, of course, Canada does have, in addition to the provincial and
municipal police forces, a national law enforcement agency, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police. See C. REam, THE BLIND EYE OF HISTORY ch. 10 (1952), for
an historical summation of the reasons for local control in the case of the police.
The chief complaints against the present Canadian system of criminal
law administration have been that nation-wide laws do not always meet local
needs and that the courts of different provinces diverge in their construction of
the law. These complaints have resulted in proposals to substitute the principle
of supremacy for that of exclusiveness in law-making, in order to "enable the
provinces to pass police measures without any question of exceeding their pow-
ers." See O'HEARN, supra note 59, at 147-48.
The principle of supremacy is, of course, the solution which has been
adopted in the United States. U.S. CONST. art. VI. But cf. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. X.
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tion. We have not followed it in the ordinary application of
the principle. In Canada, the prosecution is entitled to appeal
from errors in law . . . . Our appeal system works well and
is actually beneficial to the accused, because trial judges know
that any errors they make in favor of the accused can be cor-
rected and are not so prone to determine questions in favour
of the prosecution . . .61
61. O'HEARN, supra note 59, at 235-38.
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